On On the the Irreplaceability Irreplaceability of of Animal Animal Life Life As As animal animal rights rights becomes becomes a a fash fash ionable ionable topic topic of of debate debate within within the the aca aca demic demic community, community, we we see see a a spate spate of of arguments arguments emerging emerging which which deny deny or or conflict conflict with with the the fundamental fundamental moral moral principles principles of of equal equal consideration consideration of of interests. interests. Whatever Whatever the the motivation motivation for for such such arguments, arguments, the the practical practical result result is is the the putative putative justification justification of of the the continued continued use, use, abuse, abuse, and and slaughter slaughter of of non-human non-human animals animals for for man's man's own own purposes--purposes purposes--purposes which which are are by by no no means means consistent consistent with with the the telos telos of of the the animals animals themselves. themselves.
One One example example is is the the so-called so-called "replacement "replacement argument," argument," the the very very name name of of which which calls calls attention attention to to the the traditional traditional view view of of animals animals as as mere mere things, things, interchangeable interchangeable from from the the point point of of view view of of human human utility. utility. The The replacement replacement a a rgument rgument derives derives from from classical classical utilitarianism,2 utilitarianism,2 but but has has been been recently recently revived revived with with various various modifi modifi cations. cations. Such Such an an argument argument could could only only have have emerged emerged within within the the context context of of a a world world view view which which takes takes it it for for granted granted that that animals animals exist exist primarily primarily for for the the benefit benefit of of human human beings. beings. The The argument argument may may be be outlined outlined as as follows: follows:
Provided Provided that: that: 1. 1. an an animal's animal's life life is is on on the the whole whole "worth "worth living," living," i.e., i.e., involves involves more more pleasu pleasu re re than than pain, pain, 2. the the would would not not have have 2.
animal animal existed existed at at all all had had it it not not been been del del iberately iberately brought brought into into existence existence by by man, man, and and 3. 3. The The animal animal will will be be replaced replaced after after its its death death by by another another an an imal imal for for whom whom conditions conditions #1 #1 and and #2 #2 hold hold true, true, Then: Then: the the person person or or persons persons who who brought brought that that animal animal into into exis exis tence tence may may use use and and kill kill it it as as they they see see fit. fit. Now Now the the fundamental fundamental principle principle of of utilitarianism, utilitarianism, in in all all its its varieties, varieties, is is that that pleasure pleasure is is a a good good and and pain pain an an evil. evil. I In n the the argument argument above, above, condi condi tions tions #1 #1 and and #2 #2 are are intended intended to to guar guar antee antee that that the the animal animal is is "compensated" "compensated" for for any any pain pain inflicted inflicted upon upon it. it.
Con Con dition dition #3 #3 is is intended intended to to guarantee guarantee that that "the "the world" world" is is "compensated" "compensated" for for any any pain pain inflicted inflicted upon upon it it as as a a result result of of the the killing killing of of the the animal. animal.
But But is is such such a a compensation compensation in in fact fact possible? possible? Can Can the the unnecessary unnecessary inflic inflic tion tion of of pain pain and and death death on on non-human non-human animals animals be be morally morally justified? justified? My My aim aim here here is is to to demonstrate demonstrate that that rigorous rigorous (but (but undogmatic) undogmatic) adherence adherence to to the the principle principle that that pain pain is is an an intrinsic intrinsic evil evil entails entails the the rejection rejection of of the the replacement replacement argument. argument.
I I shall shall also also try try to to show show that, that, while while developed developed within within the the framework framework of of utilitarian utilitarian thinking, thinking, this this argument argument is is inconsistent inconsistent with with utilitarianism, utilitarianism, as as well well as as our our ordinary ordinary moral moral intuitions. intuitions.
Finally, Finally, I I shall shall consider consider how how the the argument argument would would have have to to be be modified modified in in order order to to square square with with classical classical utilita utilita rianism, rianism, the the premise premise that that pain pain is is an an intrinsic intrinsic evil, evil, and and our our ordinary ordinary moral moral intuitions. intuitions.
If If the the assumption assumption that that pain pain is is an an intrinsic intrinsic evil evil is is correct correct and and my my reasoning reasoning is is sound, sound, then then we we are are morally morally obliged obliged to to desist desist from from the the overwhelming overwhelming majority majority of of practices practices and and uses uses of of animals animals to to which which we we are are pres pres ently ently accustomed. accustomed.
-1 -1
What What does does it it mea mea n n for for someth someth i i ng ng to to be be an an intrinsic intrinsic evil? evil? If If something something is is evil evil in in itself, itself, that that means means that that it it is is not not evil evil relative relative to to something something else. else. Con Con sequently, sequently, it it can't can't be be justified justified by by any any good good which which may may result result from from it, it, nor nor be be weighed weighed against against resultant resultant good good in in determining determining how how we we shold shold act. act.
If, If, then, then, pain pain is is an an intrinsic intrinsic evil, evil, under under what what conditions, conditions, if if any, any, is is it it morally morally justified justified to to inflict inflict it? it? Let Let us us consider consider several several possible possible cases. cases.
In In each each case case we we shall shall ask ask whether whether the the infliction infliction of of pain pain is is justified justified in in terms terms of of our our premise premise that that pain pain is is an an intrin intrin sic sic evil, evil, in in terms terms of of classical classical utilita utilita rianism, rianism, and and in in terms terms of of our our ordinary ordinary moral moral intuitions. intuitions. Examination Examination of of these these various various cases cases will will enable enable us us to to judge judge whether whether or or not not the the replacement replacement argu argu ment ment is is valid. valid.
1.
No No pleasure pleasure bestowed bestowed or or resulting; resulting; no no resultant resultant relief relief of of pain pain Where Where pain pain is is inflicted inflicted which which results results neither neither in in pleasure pleasure nor nor the the relief relief of of pain, pain, and and the the being being is is not not "compen "compen sated" sated" by by the the subsequent subsequent bestowal bestowal of of pleasure, pleasure, it it is is analytically analytically obvious obvious that that such such conduct conduct is is morally morally wrong, wrong, if if pain pain is is an an intrinsic intrinsic evil. evil.
It It is is also also wrong wrong according according to to utlitarianism, utlitarianism, since since to to so so act act is is in in no no way way to to promote promote the the balance balance of of pleasure pleasure over over pain. pain. Finally, Finally, it it is is in in obvious obvious violation violation of of our our ordinary ordinary moral moral intuitions. intuitions.
2.
Greater Greater pleasure pleasure bestowed bestowed In In this this case, case, the the animal animal is is "compensated" "compensated" to to some some degree degree for for the the infliction infliction of of pain pain by by the the subsequent subsequent bestowal bestowal of of greater greater pleasure. pleasure. The The pain, pain, however, however, is is in in no no way way necessary necessary to to the the enjoy enjoy . . ment ment of of the the pleasure. pleasure.
If If pain pain is is intrinsically intrinsically evil, evil, it it obviously obviously cannot cannot be be cancelled cancelled out out by by the the unrelated unrelated bestowal bestowal of of pleasure. pleasure.
Utilitarianism Utilitarianism wou wou Id Id also also reject reject this this case case as as immoral, immoral, since since in in inflicting inflicting the the pain pain one one is is not not acting acting in in such such a a way way as as to to maximize maximize pleasure. pleasure.
Our Our moral moral intuitions intuitions conti conti ,':11 ,':11 these these concl concl usions. usions. Most Most of of us us would would be be '!owilling '!owilling to to operate· operate· on on the the principle principle thai: thai: it it is is morally morally right right to to wrong wrong provided provided one one does does more more right right than than wron:J. wron:J.
. .
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3. 3. Resultant Resultant greater greater pleasure pleasure This This case case is is based based on on a a strong strong version version of of the the principle principle that that the the end end justifies justifies the the means. means.
Here Here the the infliction infliction of of pain pain results results in in greater greater pleasure: pleasure:
for for the the "world,"· "world,"· other other individuals, individuals, or or the the being being himself. himself.
If If pain pain is is an an intrinsic intrinsic evil, evil, however, however, it it is is not not commensurable commensurable with with pleasure, pleasure, i.e., i.e., cannot cannot be be can can celled celled out out by, by, or or weighed weighed against against resultant resultant pleaure pleaure in in determining determining the the moral moral . . value value of of a a particular particular act. act. Where Where the the totality totality of of pleasure pleasure in in the the world world is is increased increased as as a a result result of of the the infliction infliction of of pain, pain, it it is is theoretically theoretically possible possible that that the the individual individual level. level. of of happiness happiness of of all all the the beings beings concerned concerned might might be be reduced. reduced.
For For example, example, by by reducing reducing the the level level of of individual individual com com fort fort in in an an ameliorated ameliorated factory factory farm, farm, the the farmer farmer may may be be able able to to house house more more chickens chickens under under conditions conditions which which pre pre serve serve a a slight slight balance balance of of pleasure pleasure over over pain pain for for individual individual chickens, chickens, while while at at the the same same time time creating creating a a total total level level of of happiness happiness which which is is greater greater than than before. before.
Consequently, Consequently, not not all all versions versions of of utilitarianism utilitarianism would would accept accept such such con con duct duct as as morally morally justified. justified. It It would would be be inconsistent, inconsistent, for for example, example, wth wth Bent Bent ham's ham's principle principle of of "the "the greatest greatest hap hap pi pi ness ness of of the the greatest greatest number." number." Ou Ou r r moral moral intuitions intuitions confirm confirm that that it it is is not not justified justified to to inflict inflict pain pain on on someone someone else else to to increase increase the the world's world's total total level level of of happiness happiness or or pleasure. pleasure.
Where Where it it is is other other individuals, individuals, rather rather than than "the "the world," world," who who experi experi ence ence an an increase increase in in pleasure pleasure as as a a result result of of the the infliction infliction of of pain, pain, classi classi cal cal utilitarianism utilitarianism would, would, in in principle, principle, accept accept such such conduct conduct as as morally morally justi justi fied fied since since it it promotes promotes a a balance balance of of pleasu pleasu re re over over pain. pain. As As in in the the previ previ ous ous . . case, case, our our ordinary ordinary moral moral intui intui tions, tions, and and the the premise premise that that pain pain is is an an intrinsic intrinsic evil evil tell tell us us that that it it is is morally morally wrong wrong to to inflict inflict pain pain on on one one being being to to promote promote pleasure pleasure in in another. another.
Even Even where where the the infliction infliction of of pain pain results results in in greater greater pleasure pleasure for for the the being being himself, himself, the the premise premise that that pain pain is is an an intrinsic intrinsic evil evil would would prohibit prohibit such such conduct conduct as as morally morally unjustified. unjustified.
An An individual individual may may indeed indeed choose choose to to suffer suffer lesser lesser pain pain for for the the sake sake of of enjoying enjoying greater greater pleasure, pleasure, but but if if pain pain is is intrinsically intrinsically evil, evil, then then no no one one else else has has the the right right to to presume presume that that he he would would make make this this choice, choice, or or to to inflict inflict pain pain on on a a being being "for "for his his own own good." good." Utilita Utilita rianism, rianism, of of course, course, would would regard regard such such conduct conduct as as morally morally justified justified since since pain pain and and pleasure pleasure can can be be weighed weighed against against each each other. other. Our Our ordinary ordinary moral moral intu intu itions itions appear appear ambiguous ambiguous in in this this case. case. If If no no problematic problematic examples examples are are cited, cited, most most of of us us would would probably probably regard regard the the principle principle expressed expressed here here as as justified. justified. Cou Cou nter-examples, nter-examples, however, however, easily easily come come to to mind. mind. We We may may admit admit that that the the pleasure pleasure which which eventually eventually results results from from a a child child prodigy's prodigy's being being coerced coerced by by his his parents parents into into long, long, grueling grueling hours hours of of practice practice at at the the piano piano is is greater greater than than the the pain pain the the child child suffered suffered as as a a result result of of being being deprived deprived of of the the normal normal joys joys of of childhood, childhood, without without being being willing willing to to acknowledge acknowledge that that the the parents' parents' actions actions were were morally morally justified. justified.
The The price price of of suffering suffering the the pain pain may may be be "too "too great" great" even even where where the the pleasure pleasure that that results results is is greater. greater.
'I. 'I.
Prevention Prevention or or relief relief of of greater greater suffering suffering in in others others Th Th is is case case is is by by far far the the most most difficult difficult and and problematic, problematic, and and the the one one upon upon which which the the issue issue of of animal animal abuse abuse principally principally turns. turns.
The The legitimacy legitimacy of of deliberately deliberately inflicting inflicting lesser lesser pain pain to to relieve relieve greater greater pain pain in in others others is is based based on on a a weak weak version version of of the the principle principle that that the the end end justifies justifies the the means. means.
If If pain pain is is an an intrinsic intrinsic evil, evil, then then it it wou wou Id Id seem seem obvious obvious that that we we should should attempt attempt to to eliminate eliminate as as much much of of it it as as possible. possible.
It It might· might· therefore therefore seem seem that that if if we we can can eliminate eliminate greater greater pain pain by by inflicting inflicting lesser lesser pain, pain, we we should should do do it. it. On On the the other other hand, hand, if if pain pain is is intrinsically intrinsically evil, evil, then then it it would would also also seem seem that that we we should should never never inflict inflict it, it, that that even even relief relief of of greater greater pain pain could could not not justify justify deliberate deliberate infliction infliction of of an an intrinsic intrinsic evil. evil.
The The principle principle that that pain pain is is an an intrinsic intrinsic evil evil thus thus does does not not seem, seem, in in and and of of itself, itself, to to provide provide any any clear· clear· solution. solution. to to the the question. question. There There are, are, however, however, several several relevant relevant considerations considerations which which will will help help lead lead us us to to a a sol sol ution ution . .
Fi Fi rst rst of of all, all, is is the the infliction infliction of of the the lesser lesser pain pain the the only only means means of of relieving relieving the the greater greater pain? pain?
If If not, not, it it seems seems quite quite clear, clear, in in terms terms of of both both utilita utilita rianism rianism and and the the principle principle that that pain pain is is an an intrinsic intrinsic evil, evil, that that such such conduct conduct would would be be morally morally wrong. wrong.
Secondly, Secondly, is is the the failure failure to to prevent prevent or or alleviate alleviate pain pain as as morally morally wrong wrong as as the the deliberate deliberate infliction infliction of of it? it? If If not, not, then then the the greater greater seriousness seriousness of of delib delib erately erately inflicting inflicting pain pain might might counter counter balance balance the the weight weight of of the the greater greater pain pain which which is is not not relieved, relieved, so so that that inflic inflic tion tion of of the the lesser lesser pain pain would would be be mor mor ally ally unjustified. unjustified.
Thirdly, Thirdly, IS IS the the being being upon upon whom whom the the lesser lesser pain pain is is inflicted inflicted in in any any way way responsible responsible for for the the greater greater pain pain which which is is being being relieved relieved or or prevented? prevented? Self-defense Self-defense would would be be a a typical typical instance instance of of this this case. case. It It seems seems clearly clearly justified, justified, for for example, example, to to inflict inflict lesser lesser pain pain on on an an animal, animal, by by whom whom one one is is being being attacked, attacked, in in order order to to prevent prevent suffering suffering greater greater harm, harm, assuming, assuming, as as already already mentioned, mentioned, that that there there is is method method harm. harm. no no reasonably reasonably safe safe alternative alternative of of preventing preventing the the greater· greater· The The same same reasoning reasoning would would apply apply (with (with perhaps perhaps somewhat somewhat less less force) force) to to the the case case of of inflicting inflicting lesser lesser pain pain on on a a being being to to prevent prevent greater greater harm harm to to someone someone else else whom whom that that being being is is th th reaten reaten i ing. ng.
It It would would appear, appear, therefore, therefore, that that we we can can at at least least delimit delimit three three subcases subcases where where the the legitimacy legitimacy of of inflicting inflicting lesser lesser suffering suffering to to relieve relieve greater greater suffering suffering is is determinable. determinable. It It is is never never morally morally justified justified to to inflict inflict pain pain to to relieve relieve it it if if the the latter latter pain pain could could have have been been relieved relieved in in some some other other way. way.
It It is is always· always· morally morally justified justified to to inflict inflict lesser lesser pain pain on on a a being being in in self-defense self-defense in in order order to to prevent· prevent· greater greater pain pain from from being being inflicted inflicted on on oneself, oneself, where where there there is is no no other other way way of of preventing preventing it. it. Finally, Finally, it it will will in in most most cases cases be be justi justi fied fied to to inflict inflict lesser lesser pain pain on on one one being being to to prevent prevent him him .from .from inflicting inflicting greater greater pain pain on on someone someone else, else, again again provided provided that that this this is is the the only only means means of of pre pre venting venting it. it.
Where Where it. it. is is a a question question of of deliber deliber ately ately inflicting inflicting pain pain on on a a being being who who is is innocent, innocent, i.e., i.e., in in no no way way responsible responsible for for the the greater greater pain pain one one is is attempting attempting to to prevent prevent or or alleviate, alleviate, things things are, are, of of course, course, much much more more difficult, difficult, and and here here our our moral moral intuitions intuitions appear appear to to be be ambiguous. ambiguous.
The The smaller smaller the the pain pain inflicted inflicted is is in in relation relation to to the the pain pain relieved, relieved, the the more more we we will will be be inclined inclined to to regard regard it it as as justified. justified. The The greater greater it it is, is, the the less less likely likely that that we we will will regard regard it it as as justified. justified.
It It may may be be that that we we would would want want to to draw draw the the line line at at some some point, point, maintaining maintaining that that if if the the ratio ratio between between the the pain pain inflicted inflicted and and . . the the pain pain relieved relieved is is great great enough, enough, then then the the principle principle is is morally morally valid, valid, but but otherwise otherwise not. not.
Such Such a a position position would, would, of of course, course, entail entail enormous, enormous, perhaps perhaps insuperable insuperable pragmatic pragmatic diffi diffi culties culties in in properly properly calculating calculating the the pain pain ratio ratio in in given given concrete concrete moral moral situ situ ations, ations, but but is is a a coherent coherent position position in in theory. theory.
Whatever Whatever we we decide, decide, how how ever, ever, the the principle principle must must be be applied applied consistently consistently if if we we are. are. not not to to be be guilty guilty of of moral moral hypocrisy. hypocrisy.
Most Most of of us us are are perfectly perfectly willing willing to to accept accept this this principle principle without without qualifica qualifica tion tion as as a a maxim maxim for for action action in in the the world world so so long long as· as· it it is is a a non-human non-human who who suffers suffers the the pain pain and and a a human human whose whose pain pain is is relieved. relieved.
Few Few of of us us would would be be willing willing to to apply apply it it without without E&A E&A I I II/4 II/4 qualification qualification to to human human beings. beings.
Fewer Fewer still still would would acknowledge acknowledge that that it it is is mor mor ally ally justifiable justifiable to to conduct conduct painful painful experiments experiments on on a a human human being being to to find find a a cure cure for for parvo parvo in in dogs. dogs.
Yet Yet why why not? not?
I Is s there there a a relevant relevant difference difference between between human human and and non-human non-human animals animals which which would would justify justify this this preferential preferential treatment? treatment?
It It seems seems quite quite clear, clear, at at least least in in the the case case of of the the vast vast majority majority of of non-human non-human animals, animals, that that there there is is not. not.
There There seems seems to to be be no no morally morally valid valid ground ground for for not not consistently consistently applying applying the the principle principle that that relief relief of of greater greater suffering suffering justifies justifies infliction infliction of of pain, pain, and and indeed, indeed, to to demand, demand, for for the the sake sake of of such such consistency, consistency, that that humans humans be be made made to to suffer suffer equally equally for for the the benefit benefit of of dogs dogs and and other other non-human non-human animals. animals.
If, If, on on the the other other hand, hand, for for some some reason reason we we are are unwilling unwilling to to subject subject humans humans to to such such suffering, suffering, then then we we must must also also refrain, refrain, if if we we do do not not wish wish to to be be guilty guilty of of moral moral hypocrisy, hypocrisy, from from inflicing inflicing it it on on non-human non-human animals. animals.
It It
wou wou Id Id therefore therefore seem seem that that although although this this principle principle is is clearly clearly con con sistent sistent with with utilitarianism, utilitarianism, and and not not clearly clearly inconsistent inconsistent with with the the principle principle that that pain pain is is an an intrinsic intrinsic evil, evil, it it involves involves consequences consequences which which the the vast vast majority majority of of us us would would be be unwilling unwilling to to accept. accept. 4 4 If If this this is is so, so, then then the the only only inflic inflic tion tion of of pain pain on on animals animals or or anyone anyone ele ele which which we we may may accept accept as as morally morally justi justi fiable fiable is is for for defense defense or or for for the the benefit benefit of of the the being being himself. himself. This This conclusion conclusion effectively effectively eliminates eliminates as as immoral immoral the the overwhelming overwhelming majority majority of of ou ou r r uses uses of of animals. animals.
-2 -2 Having Having examined, examined, from from the the stand stand point point of of these these three three viewpoints, viewpoints, the the various various possible possible cases cases of of inflicting inflicting pain, pain, let let us us now now look look at at the the necessary necessary conditions conditions cited cited in in the the replacement replacement argument argument for for the the moral moral justifiability justifiability of of inflicting inflicting pain pain on on non-human non-human animals. animals.
There There are are two two kinds kinds of of benefits benefits which which proponents proponents of of this this argument argument believe believe compensate compensate the the animal. animal.
The The first first is is the the benefit benefit of of being being able able to to live live out out at at least least a a portion portion of of his his natu natu ral ral life life in in a a condition condition in in which which there there is is a a preponderance preponderance of of pleasure pleasure over over pain pain (premise (premise #1). #1). The The second second is is the the "benefit "benefit of of existence" existence" (premise (premise #2). #2). A A little little reflection reflection upon upon these these supposed supposed "benefits" "benefits" reveals reveals that that in in most most cases cases they they are are no no benefits benefits at at all. all.
Permit Permit ting ting an an animal animal to to lead lead a a semblance semblance of of his his natu natu ral ral life, life, rather rather than than totally totally thwarting thwarting his his physical, physical, psychological, psychological, and and behavioral behavioral needs--which needs--which is is what what is is usually usually meant meant by by allowing allowing the the ani ani mal mal to to have have a a life life "worth "worth living"--is living"--is in in no no way way to to bestow bestow a a benefit benefit upon upon him, him, but but merely merely to to refrain refrain from from a a greater greater evil. evil. What What unabashed unabashed pretension pretension on on the the pa pa rt rt of of the· the· "concerned" "concerned" fa fa rmer rmer and and the the "humane" "humane" experimenter experimenter (not (not to to mention mention the the college college professor professor who who supports supports them) them) to to claim claim that that they they are are doing doing the the animal animal a a favor favor by by allowing allowing him him to to live live in in somewhat somewhat the the manner manner he he would would live live anyway, anyway, under under natural natural conditions, conditions, apart apart from from their their interfer interfer ence ence and and exploitation. exploitation. As As Dale Dale Jamie Jamie son son has has pointed pointed out, out, animals animals don't don't need need to to be be protected protected by by ma ma n n ; ; th th ey ey simply simply need need to to be be left left alone. alone. To To allow allow animals animals to to be be what what they they are are is is not not magnanimity magnanimity on on man's man's part; part; it it is is sim sim ple ple justice. justice.
To To do do so so is is merely merely to to give give animals animals their their due. due. Were Were it it not not for for the the fact fact that that we we live live in in a a world world in in which which gross gross institutionalized institutionalized abuse abuse of of animals animals is is the the rule, rule, rather rather than than the the exception, exception, such such action action would would not not even even merit merit commendation. commendation.
While While the the replacement replacement argument argument as as given given would, would, of of course, course, allow allow a a per per son son to to treat treat animals animals in in a a way way which which is is morally morally justified justified according according to to the the premise premise that that pain pain is is intrinsically intrinsically evil, evil, it it in in no no way way requires requires him him to to do do so, so, and and indeed indeed permits permits conduct conduct of of the the worst worst sort sort (i. (i. e, e, . . case case #1) #1) as as analyzed analyzed above. above.
For For example: example: it it is is perfectly perfectly compatible compatible with with the the replacement replacement agu agu ment ment to to wantonly wantonly and and sadistically sadistically engage engage in in the the periodic periodic beating beating of of a a dog dog which which one one has has deliberately deliberately bred, bred, provided provided that that such such treatment treatment does does not not occur occur so so often often as as to to make make the the dog's dog's life life on on the the whole whole more more painful painful than than pleasurable. pleasurable.
The The replacement replacement argu argu ment ment does does not not require require that that any any good good whatever whatever result result from from the the infliction infliction of of pain, pain, whether whether for for the the animal animal or or any any one one else. else.
It It does does not not even even require require that that one one "compensate" "compensate" the the animal animal for for the the useless useless pain pain inflicted inflicted upon upon it it (case (case #2). #2).
It It is is sufficient sufficient that that the the animal's animal's life life is is on on balance balance "worth "worth liv liv ing," ing," even even though though one one may may have have reduced reduced that that animal's· animal's· level level of of happi happi ness ness well well below below what what it it otherwise otherwise wou wou Id Id have have been been without without thereby thereby increasing increasing in in the the slightest slightest anyone anyone else's else's happiness, happiness, or or relieving relieving anyone's anyone's pain. pain.
The The objection objection might might be be made made that that the the replacement replacement argument's argument's second second premise--that premise--that the the animal animal would would not not have have existed existed at at all all were were it it not not for for the the person person who who brought brought him him into into exis exis tence--guarantees tence--guarantees that that the the satisfaction satisfaction of of the the first first premise--that premise--that the the animal's animal's life life is is on on the the whole whole "worth "worth living"--is living"--is due, due, at at least least indi indi rectly, rectly, to to the the person person who who inflicts inflicts the the pain pain and and that that there there fore fore case case #1 #1 is is excl excl uded uded by by the the replacement replacement argument. argument.
The The bestowal bestowal of of pleasure, pleasure, in in other other words, words, which which "compensates" "compensates" the the dog dog for for the the inflic inflic tion tion of of pain, pain, even even if if provided provided directly directly by by others, others, is is indirectly indirectly provided provided by by the the "owner," "owner," insofar insofar as as he he brought brought the the dog dog into into existence existence and and thereby thereby made made it it possible possible for for others others to to bestow bestow benefits benefits on on him. him.
As As ludicrous ludicrous as as this this objection objection appears, appears, let let us us suppose suppose it it is is justified. justified. It It would would still still be be perfectly perfectly possible possible for for someone someone to to inflict inflict pain pain on on an an animal animal without without di di rectly rectly bestowing bestowing any any benefit benefit whatever whatever upon upon it it himself, himself, so so long long as as there there were were others others who who were were suffi suffi cienty cienty concerned concerned to to provide provide such such benefits, benefits, or or the the animal animal himself, himself, due due to to otherwise otherwise favorable favorable conditions, conditions, was was able able to to preserve preserve the the balance balance of of pleas pleas ure ure over over pain pain in in his his own own life. life.
All All that that the the replacement replacement argument argument requires, requires, in in other other words, words, for for the the infliction infliction of of pain pain on on animals, animals, is is satis satis faction, faction, in in the the weakest weakest possible possible sense, sense, of of the the criteria criteria cited cited in in case case #2. #2.
But But that that case, case, as as we we have have seen, seen, must must be be rejected rejected as as immoral immoral if if we we believe believe that that pain pain is is an an intrinsic intrinsic evil, evil, if if we we are are utilitarians, utilitarians, or or if if we· we· abide abide by by our our ordinary ordinary moral moral intuitions. intuitions.
-3 -3 So So far far as as the the "benefit "benefit of of existence" existence" in in concerned, concerned, that that product product of of skewed skewed logic logic has has al al ready ready been been adequately adequately refuted refuted by by Peter Peter Singer Singer in in Animal Animal Liberation,S Liberation,S more more recent recent attempts attempts to to resuscitate resuscitate it it notwithstandi notwithstandi ng. ng. 6 6 As As Singer Singer has has poi poi nted nted out, out, there there is is no no being being upon upon whom whom the the "benefit "benefit of of exis exis tence" tence" may may be be conferred. conferred. The The root root of of the the error error is is a a confusion confusion between between being being alive alive vs. vs. being being dead, dead, and and existing existing vs. vs. not not existing. existing. Aliveness Aliveness and and deadness deadness are are both both forms forms of of existence. existence. When When a a being being which which was was alive alive dies, dies, it it still still exists, exists, although although the the form form of of its its exis exis tence tence has has changed. changed.
It It is is a a lifeless lifeless body body rather rather than than a a live live body. body. . . It It is is perfectly perfectly reasonable reasonable to to speak speak of of the the state state of of being being alive alive as as preferable preferable to to the the state state of of being being dead, dead, since since in in both both cases cases something something exists exists which which is is the the "subject" "subject" of of those those states. states.
From From the the vantage vantage point point of of life, life, a a comparison comparison of of being being alive alive with with being being dead dead can can be be made. made.
No No comparison comparison can can be be made made between between existing existing and and not not existing existing since since "a "a being being which which does does not not exist" exist" (a (a self-contradictory self-contradictory ph ph rase) rase) is is not not in in any any state state which which can can be be compared compared in in its its quality quality to to a a state state of of existence. existence. To To E&A E&A 111/4 111/4 not not exist exist is is thus thus neither neither better better nor nor worse worse than than to to exist; exist; it it lies lies enti enti rely rely outside outside the the realm realm of of values, values, is is abso abso I Iutely utely qualityless. qualityless.
Consequently, Consequently, it it makes makes no no sense sense whatsoever whatsoever to to speak speak of of benefiting benefiting a a "non-existent "non-existent being" being" by by bringing bringing "it" "it" into into existence. existence.
Singer, Singer, however, however, has has come come to to doubt doubt the the truth truth of of h h is is former former position position on on the the issue. issue. I In n Practical Practical Ethics Ethics he he states: states: "When "When I I wrote wrote Animal Animal Libera Libera tion tion I I accepted accepted Salt's Salt's view. view. I I thought thought that that it it was was absu absu rd rd to to tal tal k k as as if if one one conferred conferred a a favou favou r r on on a a bei bei ng ng by by bringing bringing it it into into existence, existence, since since at at the the time time one one confers confers this this favor, favor, there there is is no no being being at at ali. ali.
But But now now I I am am less less confident. confident. . . After After all all . . . . . . we we do do seem seem to to do do something something bad bad if if we we knowingly knowingly bring bring a a miserable miserable being being into into exis exis tence, tence, and and if if this this is is so, so, it it is is difficult difficult to to explain explain why why we we do do not not do do some some thing thing good good when when we we knowingly knowingly bring bring a a happy happy being being into into existence. existence. "7 "7 This This is is one one of of the the "assymetrical "assymetrical relations" relations" which which has has led led Singer Singer and and others others into into doubting doubting his his former former posi posi tion. tion. The The other other is: is:
"If "If you you harm harm a a being being by by ending ending its its life, life, why why do do you you not not benefit benefit it it by by beginning beginning its its life?" life?" Puzzlement Puzzlement over over this this second second relation relation is is more more easily easily I'esolved I'esolved than than over over the the fi fi rst. rst.
The The reason reason it it is is possible possible to to harm harm a a being being by by ending ending its its life life is, is, first, first, because because there there is is a a being being which which has has life life and and can can be be harmed, harmed, and and sec sec ond, ond, because because as as living living beings beings with with experience experience of of dead dead beings, beings, we we are are in in a a position position to to judge judge the the value value of of the the sate sate of of aliveness aliveness as as compared compared with with the the state state of of deadness. deadness. Since Since all all the the evi evi dence dence indicates indicates that that it it is is usually usually bet bet ter ter to to be be alive alive than than dead, dead, we we are are accustomed accustomed to to believing believing that that ending ending a a being's being's life life harms harms him. him. In In the the case case of of "non-existent "non-existent beings," beings," neither neither of of these these is is the the case. case. There There is is no no being being who who can can be be benefited benefited by by bringing bringing "it" "it" into into existence, existence, and and there there is is no no basis basis of of comparison, comparison, as as already already noted, noted, between between non-existence non-existence and and a a state state of of existence. existence.
The The second second "assymetrical "assymetrical relation" relation" is is more more complex. complex. The The answer answer to to the the question, question, "Why "Why is is it it not not morally morally good good to to bring bring a a being being into into the the world world which which will will be be happy?" happy?" is is quite quite simply simply that that prima prima facie, facie, it it is is good good to to bring bring such such a a being being into into the the world world (leaving (leaving aside aside such such relevant relevant considerations considerations as: as: how how one one can can be be certain certain the the being being will will be be happy, happy, how how this this might might negatively negatively affect affect the the happiness happiness of of others others al al ready ready in in the the world, world, the the overpopu overpopu lation lation problem, problem, world world hunger, hunger, etc.). etc.). This This is is not not equivalent, equivalent, however, however, to to saying saying that that one one benefits benefits a a "non-existent "non-existent being" being" by by bringing bringing "it" "it" into into the the world. world.
It It is is morally morally good good to to bring bring a a being being into· into· the the world world which which will will be be happy happy because because this this act act provides provides the the possibil possibil ity ity for for the the benefit benefit of of happiness happiness to to be be bestowed bestowed upon upon the the being, being, but but it it is is not not itself itself a a benefit benefit bestowed bestowed upon upon the the being, being, since since there there is is as as yet yet no no being being upon upon which which to to bestow bestow It. It.
On. On. the the other other hand, hand, it it is is morally morally bad bad to to bring bring a a being being into into the the world world which which will will be be miserable miserable because because this this act act provides provides the the possibility possibility for for harm harm to to be be inflicted inflicted upon upon the the being, being, but, but, similarly, similarly, it it is is not not itself itself a a harm harm inflicted inflicted upon upon the the being, being, since since there there is is as as yet yet no no being being upon upon which which to to inflict inflict it. it.
The The parallel parallel thus thus proves proves that that while while bringing bringing a a being being into into the the world world may may be be a a good good or or bad bad act act depending depending on on whether whether the the being being will will be be happy happy or or miserable, miserable, it it does does not not itself itself either either benefit benefit or or harm harm the the being, being, but but only only provides provides the the possibility possibility for for benefiting benefiting or or harming harming the the being. being. Thus Thus the the ben ben efit efit of of existence existence premise premise adds adds nothing nothing to to the the replacement replacement argument argument to to justify justify the the infliction infliction of of pain pain or or death death so so far far as as the the animal animal is is concerned. concerned. 8 8 It It does does not not offset, offset, nor nor can can it it be be weighed weighed against against the the animal's animal's pain pain or or death, death, since since non-existence non-existence cannot cannot be be meas meas ured ured against against a a happy happy existence, existence, nor, nor, for for that that matter, matter, against against a a miserable miserable one. one.
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It It is is neither neither better better nor nor worse worse to to have have existed existed than than to to have have not not existed, existed, for for existence, existence, in in itself, itself, is is neither neither good good nor nor bad. bad. 1 1 D D According According to to the the replacement replacement argu argu ment,it ment,it would would not not be be justified justified to to kill kill a a deer deer born born in in the the wild, wild, even even if if the the deer deer could could be be replaced replaced by by one one bred bred for for that that purpose purpose and and its its life life on on bal bal ance ance was was "worth "worth living." living."
Yet Yet how how does does this this case case differ differ from from that that of of a a factory factory farm farm pig? pig? What What has has one one given given the the pig pig which which one one has has not not given given the the deer? deer? The The answer, answer, obviously, obviously, is is "its "its life." life." But But as as we we have have seen, seen, existence existence in in itself itself is is neither neither good good nor nor bad. bad. It It depends depends on on how how the the animal animal is is treated treated after after . . it it is is brought brought into into existence. existence. Giving Giving it it its its life life may may even even be be morally morally wrong wrong if if one one intends intends to to ill ill treat treat it, it, for for one one thereby thereby provides provides the the opportu opportu nity nity for for that that ill-treatment. ill-treatment.
Hence Hence giving giving the the pig pig life life is is in in no no sense sense to to bestow bestow a a benefit benefit upon upon it. it.
Conse Conse quently, quently, if if one one treated treated the the pig pig and and deer deer equally equally well, well, there there would would be be no no more more justification, justification, in in terms terms of of the the ani ani mals mals themselves; themselves; 11 11 for for killing killing the the pig pig than than for for killing killing the the deer. deer. -4 -4 What What of of the the second second claim claim that that the the replacement replacement argument argument purports purports to to prove, prove, namely, namely, that that given given the the condi condi tions tions cited cited above, above, the the infliction infliction of of death death upon upon an an animal animal is is justified? justified? It It is is obvious obvious that that the the replacement replacement argu-: argu-: ment ment assumes assumes that that the the lives lives of of non non human human animals animals have have no no intrinsic intrinsic value value apart apart from from the the animals' animals' capacity capacity to to experience experience pleasure pleasure and and pain. pain. In In this this it it is is consistent consistent with with classical classical uitlitari uitlitari anism, anism, which which reduces reduces good good and and evil evil to to pleasure pleasure and and pain. pain.
The The assumption assumption that that pain pain is is the the only only moral moral issue issue at at stake stake in in the the killing killing of of an an animal animal is is grossly grossly counter-intuitive, counter-intuitive, although although a a utilitarian utilitarian would would try try to to show, show, of of course, course, that that all all forms forms of of intrinsic intrinsic value value which which might might be be attributed attributed to to animals' animals' lives lives are are reducible reducible to to forms forms of of pleasure. pleasure.
The The replacement replacement argument argument as as stated, stated, however, however, quite quite clearly clearly fails fails to to justify justify the the infliction infliction of of death death on on non non human human animals, animals, just just as as it it fails fails to to jus jus tify tify the the infliction infliction of of pain. pain.
I In n this this regard, regard, too, too, it it is is inconsistent inconsistent with with the the assumption assumption that that pain pain is is an an intrin intrin sic sic evil, evil, with with classical classical utilitarianism, utilitarianism, and and with with our our ordinary ordinary moral moral intui intui tions. tions. I In n the the fi fi rst rst place, place, so. so. fa fa r r as as the the animal animal itself itself is is concerned, concerned, it it fails fails to to exclude exclude the the unjustified unjustified infliction infliction of of pain pain in in the the process process of of killing. killing.
I Infiic nfiic tion tion of of pa pa i i nfu nfu I I death, death, with with no no good good whatsoever whatsoever resulting resulting for for anyone anyone else, else, is is perfectly perfectly compatible compatible with with the the replacement replacement a a rgument, rgument, provided provided that that the the pain pain involved involved is is not not so so great great as as to to make make the the animal's animal's life life asa asa whole whole more more painful painful than than pleasurable. pleasurable.
One One must must also also take take into into account account the the pain pain of of those those who who may may be be affected affected by by the the animal's animal's death. death. The The most most obvious obvious way way in in which which an an animal's animal's death death could could cause cause pain pain to to others others in in the the world, world, whether whether human human or or non-human, non-human, is is th th rough rough thei thei r r sense sense of of loss loss or or mou mou rn rn ing ing for for that that animal. animal.
It It is is ludicrous ludicrous to to suppose suppose that that this this pain pain can can be be elimi elimi nated nated by by simply simply replacing replacing the the animal animal with with another. another.
Even Even if if one one kills kills the the animal animal painlessly, painlessly, that that killing killing is is unjustified unjustified if if it it results results in in pain pain to to another another unless unless it it also also results results in in the the relief relief of of greater greater suffering suffering for for that that being. being.
The The replacement replacement argument, argument, however, however, quite quite clearly clearly permits permits inflic inflic tion tion of of incidental incidental pain pain on on someone someone else else as as a a result result of of the the killing killing of of an an animal animal without without rei rei ief ief of of greater greater s s ufferi ufferi ng. proponents proponents of of the the replacement replacement argu argu ment ment are are chiefly chiefly concerned concerned with, with, how how ever. ever.
They They speak speak instead instead of of a a reduction reduction in in the the "total "total level level of of happi happi ness" ness" in in the the world. world.
To To kill kill a a happy happy being being is· is· to to reduce reduce this this level level and and thereby thereby i indi ndi rectly rectly the the happiness happiness level level of of those those who who remain remain in in the the world. world. The The presumption presumption is is that that the the more more happiness happiness there there is is in in the the world, world, in in a a quantitative quantitative sense, sense, the the happier happier are are the the individuals individuals who who inhabit inhabit it. it.
The The dubiousness dubiousness of of this this assumption assumption has has already already been been pointed pointed out out above. above. 12 12 The The concept concept of of the the "total "total level level . . of. of. happiness" happiness" would would seem seem to to be be a a largely largely mean mean ingless ingless abstraction. abstraction.
This, This, how how ever, ever, is is the the apparent apparent reason reason for for the the introduction introduction of of the the thi thi rd rd condition condition for for inflicting inflicting pain pain and and death death on on animals, animals, namely, namely, that that it it be be replaced replaced after after its its death death by by another another happy happy animal. animal. This This premise, premise, together together with with the the "benefit "benefit of of existence" existence" premise, premise, guar-· guar-· antees antees that that the the world's world's stock stock of of hap hap piness piness will will not not be be reduced reduced by by the the killing killing of of the the animal. animal.
For For the the animal animal being being killed killed was was deliberately deliberately added added to to the the world world in in the the first first place place by by the the person person killing killing it, it, and and another another such such animal animal will will be be added added to to the the world world to to replace replace it it when when it it is is gone. gone.
It It is is obvious, obvious, however, however, that that pre pre serving serving the the same same level level of of total total happi happi ness ness in in the the world world in in no no way way justifies justifies the the pain pain inflicted inflicted on on the the world world through through the the killing killing of of animals animals bred· bred· for for that that purpose. purpose. That That pain pain is is in in no no wise wise an an unavoidable unavoidable means means to to the the relief relief of of greater greater suffering suffering of of the the animals animals them them selves selves or or of of human human beings beings whose whose suf suf fering fering is is caused caused by by those those animals. animals.
The The replacement replacement argument argument thus thus permits permits killing killing of of animals animals . . which which involves involves infliction infliction of of unjustified unjustified pain: pain: to to the the animals animals themselves, themselves, to to others others who who care care about about them, them, and and to to "the "the world." world."
Even Even without without raising raising the the question question as as to to whether whether there there are are not not other other moral moral issues issues than than pain pain involved involved in in the the killing killing of of animals, animals, it it is is obvious obvious that that the the replacement replacement argument argument fails fails to to justify justify such such killing. killing.
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Assuming Assuming we we grant grant that that pain pain is is an an intrinsic intrinsic evil, evil, our our analysis analysis has has shown shown that that the the replacement replacement argument argument as as given· given· is is insufficient insufficient to to justify justify the the infliction infliction of of pain pain and and death death on on non non human human animals. animals.
I I have have also also tried tried to to demonstrate demonstrate that that it it is is inconsistent inconsistent with with classical classical utilitarianism, utilitarianism, from from which which it it derives, derives, and and that that if if con con sis sis tently tently followed, followed, involves involves consequences consequences which which few few of of us us would would be be willing willing to to accept. accept.
Can Can the the replacement replacement argument argument be be modified modified in in such such a a way way as as to to square square with with the the assumption assumption that that pain pain is is an an intrinsic intrinsic evil, evil, with with utilitarianism, utilitarianism, and and with with ou ou r r ordi ordi na na ry ry moral moral i intu ntu itions, itions, while while still still allowing allowing us us to to use use and and kill kill animals animals for for human human benefit? benefit? Let Let us us recall recall our our conclusions conclusions regarding regarding the the cases cases in in which which the the deliberate deliberate infliction infliction of of pain pain is is morally morally justified. justified. It It is is jus jus tified, tified, we we said, said, to to inflict inflict lesser lesser pain pain on on a a being being which which is is threatening threatening us us or or someone someone else else with with greater greater pain, pain, pro pro vided vided that that this this is is the the only only way way to to prevent prevent the the greater greater pain. pain.
Secondly, Secondly, it it is is justified justified to to inflict inflict lesser lesser pain pain on on a a being being if if it it is is the the only only means means of of pre pre venting. venting. greater greater pain pain in in the the being being himself. himself. 13 13 It It should should be be obvious obvious that that these these criteria criteria effectively effectively eliminate eliminate as as immoral immoral all all use use of of animals animals for for human human benefit benefit which which involves involves any any infliction infliction of of pain pain whatsoever. whatsoever.
Some Some uses uses of of animals animals . . might might still still be be morally morally permitted, permitted, for for example, example, the the keeping keeping of of free free roving roving chickens chickens for for eggs, eggs, and and the the use use of of certain certain animals animals for for farming farming or or other other labor, labor, where where the the animal animal is is not not over over worked, worked, and and is is provided provided with with all all nec nec essary essary care, care, a a natural natural environment, environment, and and the the means means of of satisfying satisfying his his social, social, psychological, psychological, and and physical physical needs. needs. Study Study of of animals animals in in simulated simulated natural natural envi envi ronments ronments and and even even a a limited limited range range of of non-painful, non-painful, non-stressful non-stressful experi experi ments ments might might also also be be permitted permitted by by these these principles. principles.
Consumption Consumption of of the the bodies bodies of of animals animals which which have have died died a a natural natural death death would would also also involve involve no no violation violation of of these these criteria. criteria. 14 14
Quite Quite clea clea rly, rly, however, however, the the vast vast majority majority of of our our uses uses of of live live animals animals for for supposed supposed human human benefit benefit would would have have to to be be elimi elimi nated nated if if my my reasoning reasoning is is correct correct and and we we are are at at all all concerned concerned to to act act morally. morally. Such Such a a fundamental fundamental change change in in our our life-style life-style would would ideally ideally be be a a major major step step toward toward the the ultimate ultimate goal goal of of ceasing ceasing altogether, altogether, insofar insofar as as possible, possible, to to interfere interfere in in the the lives lives of of other other animals. animals.
What What about about killing? killing?
Since Since it it is is extremely extremely dubious dubious whether whether painless painless killing killing is is possible possible (or (or at at least least practi practi cable), cable), this this requirement requirement alone alone might might prohibit prohibit all all killing killing of of animals animals for for human human benefit. benefit. Let Let us us assume, assume, however, however, that that painless painless killing killing is is possible. possible.
Can Can the the replacement replacement argument argument be be revised revised in in such such a a way way as as to to ci ci rcumvent rcumvent the the problem problem of of the the incidental incidental pain pain caused caused to to others others and and to to "the "the world" world" by by the the killing killing of of the the animal? animal? So So far far as as the the first first point point is is concerned, concerned, the the sugges sugges tion tion might might be be made made that that the the animal animal could could be be raised raised in in isolation isolation both both from from humans humans and and from from his his own own kind, kind, so so as as to to avoid avoid the the problem problem of of pain pain caused caused to to others. others. In In the the case case of of many many animals, animals, however, however, this this solution solution would would betray· betray· the the criteria criteria in in a a different different way. way.
For For any any animals animals which which have have social social instincts instincts (and (and how how many many of of them them don't?) don't?) would would surely surely suffer suffer psychological psychological pain pain under under such such circumstances, circumstances, pain pain which which would would not not be be justified justified by by relief relief from from greater greater suffering suffering for for the the animals animals themselves. themselves. Two Two other other possible possible solutions, solutions, how how ever, ever, come come to to mind, mind, neither neither of of which which would would appear appear to to be be beyond beyond the the ingenuity ingenuity of of those those who who are are determined determined to to use use animals animals for for human human benefit. benefit. One One might might breed breed the the animal animal selectively selectively in in such such a a way way as as to to eliminate eliminate the the social social instinct instinct or or to to cause cause brain brain dam dam age age sufficient sufficient to to make make the the animal animal obli obli vious vious to to his his normal normal social social needs. needs. To To be· be· sure, sure, this this has has not not yet yet been been done, done, but but there there is is no no reason reason to to presume presume it it is is beyond beyond the the reach reach of of scien·ce. scien·ce. Or Or one one might might allow allow the the animal animal social social con con tact tact with with his his own own kind kind (while (while conceal conceal ing ing its its existence existence from from humans), humans), but but kill kill them them all all at at slaughter slaughter time. time.
Short Short of of these these solutions, solutions, any any kill kill ing ing of of an an animal animal which which caused caused inci inci dental dental suffering suffering to to others others could could only only be be justified justified if if it it was was the the only only means means to to the the relief relief of of their their greater greater suffer suffer ing. ing.
What What about about the the pain pain inflicted inflicted on on the the world? world? To To begin begin with, with, this this notion notion is is arguably arguably incoherent. incoherent.
It It seems seems clear clear that that "the "the world" world" cannot cannot mean mean ingfully ingfully be be regarded regarded as as a a super-indi super-indi vidual, vidual, and and that that the the total total level level of of happiness happiness in in the the world world is· is· no no gauge gauge of of the the average average level level of. of. happiness happiness of of the the individuals individuals in in the the world. world. Moreover, Moreover, it it seemS seemS patently patently absurd absurd to to maintain maintain that that a a reduction reduction in in this this total total level level of of hap hap piness piness in. in. the the world world will will have have an an impact impact on on the the happiness happiness of of all all the the individuals individuals in in the the world. world.
How How could could the the loss loss of of happiness happiness inflicted inflicted on on the the world world through through the the removal removal of of a a single single animal animal possibly possibly filter filter down down to. to. all all the the other other individuals? individuals?
It It follows follows from from this this that that the the pain pain inflicted inflicted on on the the world world through through the the killing killing of of animals animals is, is, at at most, most, pain pain inflicted inflicted on on some some individuals individuals who who are are in in a a position position to to be be negatively negatively affected affected in in one one way way or or another another by by that that killing. killing. But But it it is is difficu difficu It It to to see see who who these these individuals individuals could could be be unless unless they they are are the the very very beings beings already already discussed, discussed, who who suffer suffer loss loss from from the the killing killing of of the the animal. animal.
Thus Thus the the same same conclusions conclusions would would apply. apply.
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If If we we presume presume that that animals animals can can be be killed killed painlessly, painlessly, then then it it is is theoreti theoreti cally cally possible possible to to modify modify the the replace replace ment ment argument argument in in such such a a way way as as to to square square with with the the principle principle that that pain pain is is an an intrinsic intrinsic evil. evil.
The The modifications modifications necessary, necessary, however, however, would would virtualy virtualy eliminate, eliminate, or or render render impracticable, impracticable, the the ach ach ievement ievement of of its its original original pu pu rpose, rpose, namely, namely, to to justify justify the the continued continued use use of of animals animals for for human human benefit. benefit.
Moreover, Moreover, the the replacement replacement argu argu ment ment would would still still rest rest upon upon other other assumptions assumptions which which are are extremely extremely questionable: questionable: that that animals' animals' lives lives are are intrinsically intrinsically worthless worthless apart apart from from their their capacity capacity to to experience experience pleasu pleasu re re and and pain, pain, and and that that the the prevention prevention of of an an animal's animal's future future pleasure pleasure is is not not morally morally wrong. wrong.
All All that that is is necessary necessary to to recognize recognize the the questionableness questionableness of of these these assump assump tions tions is is to to apply apply the the test test of of our our ordi ordi nary nary moral moral intuitions intuitions to to the the revised revised version. version. Would Would we we be be willing willing to to con con sistently sistently apply apply this this argument argument to to human human beings? beings? We We may may presume presume that that human human lives lives are are generally generally of of greater greater value value than than non-human non-human lives lives and and that that for for them them pain pain is is not not the the only only consid consid eration. eration.
It It is is equally equally obvious, obvious, how how ever, ever, that that not not all all human human lives· lives· are are of of greater greater value value than than ali ali animal animal lives. lives. Would Would we we be be willing, willing, then, then, to to acknowledge acknowledge the the moral· moral· legitimacy legitimacy of of breeding breeding mentally mentally retarded retarded humans humans for for human human use use so so long long as as they they were were spared spared suffering, suffering, killed killed painlessly, painlessly, and and replaced replaced by by other other defective defective humans? humans?
If If not, not, then then I I would would draw draw the the conclusion conclusion to to which which this this whole whole enquiry enquiry has has been been tending, tending, namely, namely, that that while while animals' animals' lives lives unquestion unquestion ably ably differ differ significantly significantly in in value, value, and and no no doubt doubt are are generally generally inferior inferior in in value value to to human human lives, lives, each each and and every every
